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to adapt. This paper argues that such a process of adjustment may bring the two closer 
together,  even  if  their  starting  points  differ  considerably.  Europe  looks  at  the  ongoing 
redistribution of power as a challenge, Brazil as an opportunity. Europe is coping with the 
detrimental impact of the economic crisis on its international profile; Brazil is enhancing its 
influence in its region and  beyond. Their normative outlook is broadly  compatible; their 
political  priorities  and  behaviour  in  multilateral  frameworks  often  differ,  from  trade  to 
development and security issues. Despite the crisis, however, there are signals of renewed 
engagement  by  the  EU  on  the  international  stage,  with  a  focus  on  its  troubled 
neighbourhood and partnerships with the US and large emerging actors such as Brazil. The 
latter is charting an original course in international affairs as a rising democratic power from 
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1.   Introduction 
The  European  Union  (EU)  is  a  global  actor  in  the  making,  against  a  background  of  a 
changing  world.  There  is  a  fragile  but  unprecedented  experiment  of  political  integration 
taking place while tectonic shifts are shaking the foundations of the lab itself. The question 
for the future of Europe is whether or not internal developments and external trends are 
broadly compatible. Is the EU seeking to transcend the principle of sovereignty and balance 
of power realpolitik, while others gaining ground on the global stage are reinforcing these 
paradigms? Consonance between the normative heritage and the broad strategic posture of 
the  European  Union  and  the  key  features  of  the  emerging  international  system  would 
suggest scope for Europe to retain and even enhance its position in international affairs. 
Dissonance, with the current redistribution of power and competition of ideas draining the 
EU’s resources and credibility, would point to the marginalisation of Europe in a polycentric 
world. 
No doubt, the EU and its member states have watched uncomfortably as new or restored 
powers gain shares of the economic and political marketplace, while the neighbourhood of 
the  Union  has  been  growing  ever  more  unstable.  Europe  has  been  perceived  as  lagging 
behind developments. Arguably, however, the EU may prove better placed than others to 
address  the  mutual  vulnerabilities  associated  with  deep  interdependence  and  to  submit 
recipes for the management of shared problems.  
Although mired in a serious legitimacy and governance crisis, topped up by recession in 
most member states, the travails of the Union may point to political innovation – not decline. 
If so, the strategic outlook and priorities of the EU and Brazil, stemming from disparate 
historical  experiences  and  exposing  significant  differences  today,  may  prove  convergent 
down the line. Brazil – the ‘country of the future’ – has in many ways become a power of the 
present. Old Europe – allegedly the ‘power of the past’ – may yet again prove to be of some 
inspiration for the future, if it gets its house in order.  
2.   Europe’s evolving strategic outlook 
Whether the EU can be defined as a normative power – one that acts based on values and 
according to values – is a matter for debate. For one, the EU is not the only international 
actor that sets values and principles at the core of its foreign policy narrative.1 For another, 
the foreign policy practice of the EU or other players on the international stage does not 
entirely match this concept. Values matter in politics but they need to come to terms with the 
balance  of  other  factors  and  interests.  The  need  for  such  a  balance  intensifies  as  the 
international system grows more diverse and unstable, calling for pragmatic solutions to 
accommodate competing interests. 
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That said, beyond philosophical debates, values and norms do play a more or less direct role 
in  framing  action,  and  very  much  did  so  when  European  integration  started  with  the 
European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 and the European Economic Community of 
1957. Europe was built and defined by opposition to its past, namely to authoritarianism and 
war. It was an ambitious functionalist project (cooperation in one field would lead to joint 
efforts in others) deeply rooted in shared values (democracy, human rights and peace), and 
implemented under the American security umbrella (NATO) during the cold war. The North 
Atlantic security community provided fertile ground for European integration to prosper, 
paving  the  way  for  irreversible  peace  among member  states.  At  the same  time, since  its 
beginnings, European integration was not conceived of as an end in itself. As Jean Monnet 
put  it,  the  “Community  itself  is  only  a  stage  on  the  way  to  the  organised  world  of 
tomorrow.”2 This vocation is deeply ingrained in the ethos of the EU. But EU foreign policy 
was slow to develop, and the ‘world of tomorrow’ is proving less organised than Monnet 
would have wished for. 
The  striking  feature  of  the  environment  surrounding  the  first  decades  of  European 
integration, up to the end of the Cold War and beyond, was the marginal weight of the so-
called developing world (all but the West and the Soviet bloc), whether from an economic, 
political or security angle. What was taken for granted over those decades was in fact an 
extraordinary phase of Western predominance, which endured in different shapes from the 
early 19th century to the early 21st century. It was in this landscape that, after the demise of 
the Soviet Union, the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 established the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. Seen from this standpoint, the Balkan wars of the 1990s 
proved to be a very hard, and largely failed, test for the nascent CFSP. But the operations 
carried out by NATO in Bosnia in the mid-1990s and in Kosovo in 1999 fitted the unipolar 
moment  when  a  confident  West  would  dispatch  humanitarian  military  interventions  to 
protect  civilians  from  authoritarian  and  abusive  governments.  The  principle  of 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ would be codified by 2001 and transposed into the UN World 
Summit Declaration of 2005.3 Over the same years, following the much contested US-led 
intervention in Iraq, the EU would adopt its first (and, so far, last) overall security strategy in 
2003.4  
The  European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  started  off  by  stating:  “Europe  has  never  been  so 
prosperous, so secure nor so free.” The document codified the identity of the EU as the 
champion of “an effective multilateral system”. Its threat assessment largely focussed on 
asymmetric threats to an established order (such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and state failure). The strategy called for what could be defined nowadays 
as a ‘forward’ approach to crisis management with an emphasis on prevention and a focus 
on the deep causes of conflict. Around the Union, Europe’s transformative power would 
promote “a ring of well-governed countries”. In short, the EES directed the Union to become 
more  active,  capable  and  coherent  in  addressing  non-traditional  threats  and  stressed  the 
comprehensive and multilateral character of Europe’s international engagement. However, it 
featured no reference to the geo-strategic shifts that would soon challenge the economic and 
normative foundations of the international system itself. Brazil was not mentioned in the 
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2003 document whereas China and India only appeared, as potential strategic partners, at 
the very end of the paper. 
In pursuing  its soft  power strategy,  the  EU  sought  to  promote  regional  cooperation  and 
integration  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  for  example  establishing  partnerships  with  the 
Mercosur and the African Union. In its own neighbourhood, alongside the completion of the 
enlargement  of  the  Union  to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  the  EU  adopted  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2003. The latter mirrored the legalistic and transformative logic 
underpinning  the  enlargement  process.  It  sought  to  improve  political  and  economic 
governance  via  aid  conditional  on  reforms,  but  there  was no  agreement  among member 
states to offer commitment to the final goal of EU accession as the essential motivating factor 
for neighbouring countries.  
2003  also  saw  the  first  crisis  management  operations  deployed  under  the  then-called 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now Common Security and Defence Policy – 
CSDP),  including  the  EU  police  mission  in  Bosnia  Herzegovina  and  the  small  military 
operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As many as 27 operations have 
been launched since in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia), most of them civilian and 
eight  of  them  military.5  None  of  these  operations,  mainly  tasked  with  post-conflict 
stabilisation,  institution-building  and  training  local  forces  or  police,  may  have  achieved 
strategic objectives on their own, but some of them have made a difference on the ground, 
from  Kosovo  to  Chad,  whether  in  laying  the  basis  for  stability  or  offering  humanitarian 
protection.  CSDP  operations  became  in  a  few  years  an  important  dimension  of  EU 
engagement abroad but have not triggered a clear drive for EU member states to deepen 
defence cooperation within the EU.  
The  2008  report  on  the  implementation  of  the  ESS,  an  otherwise  rather  uninspiring 
document, deserves a mention here as evidence of the (slowly) evolving strategic outlook of 
the Union, and of creeping questions about the stability of the post-cold war order.6 The 
notion  of  a  ‘changing  world’  is  central  to  the  very  title  of  the  report,  which  starts  by 
acknowledging that globalisation has brought with it opportunities, but also made threats 
more  complex  and  interconnected,  while  “accelerating  power  shifts  and…exposing 
differences in values.” The threat assessment was complemented by a new focus on climate 
and energy security in a world of scarce resources, as well as on cyber security. The notion of 
“partnerships for effective multilateralism” was introduced, referring to cooperation with 
both multilateral organisations and other important powers, including chiefly the US but 
also Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia and South Africa. 
This report was published a few months after the start of the global financial crisis and four 
weeks after the first meeting of the G20 in Washington, in November 2008. Few anticipated 
then that the crisis would become a defining experience for the European Union, putting its 
political  resilience  and  credibility  under  very  severe  stress.  The  banking  crisis  became  a 
sovereign debt one, and evolved into a crisis of legitimacy when austerity proved the only 
answer to gaps in public finances and competitiveness. The economic downturn had three 
principal effects on EU foreign policy. For one, it diverted resources from external initiatives, 
whether in terms of aid packages or crisis management and defence, given deep cuts in 
public spending. For another, it drained focus from foreign and security policy at large, as 
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EU  member  states  turned  inwards,  quarrelling  over  the  ways  out  of  the  crisis  and 
preoccupied with deteriorating socio-economic indicators. Above all, however, the crisis has 
hit hard the very profile and credibility of the Union as a rule-based experiment of political 
integration and a supporter of effective multilateralism.7 
This  was  not  the  most  fertile  ground  for  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  in 
December 2009. The Treaty called for more policy coherence at a time when the political 
cohesion of the Union was being questioned. It established a supposedly more powerful post 
of EU foreign policy chief at a time when foreign policy took a back seat in EU priorities. 
However, it restated and expanded the normative bedrock of Europe’s foreign policy and 
external action, stating that “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the  principles  which  have  inspired  its  own  creation,  development  and  enlargement,  and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world.” (Article 21 TEU) 
The common foreign and security policy of the EU was born in the reassuring post-Cold War 
unipolar world, but was to grow up in the much tougher strategic environment of the early 
21st century, marked by asymmetric threats, power shifts and economic turmoil. It was not 
supposed to be that way. The EU was not prepared to cope with successive crises and, like 
other  major  actors,  has  been  struggling  to  adapt  to  a  more  competitive,  diverse  and 
polycentric international context. That said, the track record of the Union and of its member 
states is not all bleak and important adjustments are in the making, which hint at new levels 
of engagement and new scope for cooperation with other major actors such as Brazil.  
3.   Europe as a security provider 
Europeans feel at the same time safe and vulnerable. As in the case of Brazil, the territorial 
integrity of EU member states is not endangered and no major inter-state wars seem in sight, 
with the possible exception of hostilities involving Iran. Most Europeans do not feel to be the 
target of deliberate threats from third countries. The threat assessment fleshed out in the 
2003 ESS, as complemented by the 2008 report, remains largely relevant. And yet, Europeans 
feel  more  vulnerable  than  ten  years  ago  to  the  risks  affecting  an  increasingly  fragile 
globalisation, and to the perceived loss of influence in their vicinity. Infrastructure is exposed 
to  disruptions,  including  in  the  virtual  space,  energy  supplies  to  political  tensions  and 
security crises, commercial shipping to piracy and welfare to unchained market forces. From 
a  security  standpoint,  this  growing  sense  of  vulnerability  is  linked  to  two  concurrent 
geopolitical shifts. Both of them are challenging the EU, but also creating the opportunity for 
the Union to enhance its role of security provider.  
First, it is by now clear that the EU neighbourhood is no longer centred around the Union 
but has become a more fragmented or polycentric space.8 In the fluid context determined by 
the Arab revolutions, local actors enjoy and exploit greater scope for manoeuvre. Turkey, 
Saudi  Arabia  and  Qatar  have  taken  bold  diplomatic  initiatives  and  extended  effective 
networks  of  influence  in  North  Africa  and  the  Middle  East.  Other  major  powers  play  a 
growing role in the neighbourhood of the Union. Russia is seeking to reassert its old sphere 
of influence in the East and China is extending its economic reach well into the Gulf and the 
Mediterranean. In short, while it retains considerable influence in its vicinity, the EU is no 
longer the magnet to which most of the region is inevitably attracted.  
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Second, the US is rebalancing its strategic posture with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. 
The  much  discussed  pivot  to  Asia  does  not  necessarily  amount  to  disengagement  from 
Europe and in particular from the critical Middle East theatre.9 International security crises 
there would still see decisive American involvement and the US is keeping a close eye on 
sources of instability in the region, including via drones and Special Forces. But, alongside 
their stated disillusionment with the prospects of European ‘demilitarisation’, the US will be 
less willing to invest political capital and resources to address the many simmering tensions 
in  the  region  surrounding  the  EU.  As  the  crises  in  Libya,  Syria  and  most  recently  Mali 
demonstrate, Europeans will have to take more responsibility to support stability around the 
Union, including with military means as a last resort.  
Deepening  interdependence  requires  the  EU  to  enhance  its  engagement  in  various 
frameworks of international cooperation. As a relatively open power in economic terms and 
one  relying  on  energy  provisions  and  other  natural  resources  from  abroad,  the  EU  is 
critically dependent on the resilience of globalisation. However, geopolitical trends seem to 
point to a more regional focus for the EU as a security provider. After almost three years 
without new deployments, the EU has launched four CSDP operations since 2012. These 
include EUCAP Nestor, tasked with regional maritime capacity-building in the countries of 
the Horn of Africa and West Indian Ocean; EUAVSEC South Sudan, a tiny mission charged 
with improving security at the Juba airport; EUCAP Sahel Niger, charged with building the 
capacity of local security forces to fight terrorism and organised crime; and EUTM Mali, a 
500-strong training mission directed to enhance the operational capacity of the Malian army. 
Notably, all of these missions are taking place in the extended Southern neighbourhood of 
the Union.  
This is also the region where the Union is seeking to upgrade the implementation of the so-
called ‘comprehensive approach’ envisaged by the Treaty of Lisbon (and countless internal 
documents  and  debates)  to prevent  and manage  crises.  The  EU  has  adopted  a  ‘Strategic 
Framework for the Horn of Africa’ and a ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the 
Sahel’,  both  in  2011.  Given  the shortage  of  money,  there  is  a  risk  that  the  EU  will  start 
‘throwing  strategies  at  problems’  as  opposed  to  developing  clear  shared  priorities  and 
pursuing them by anticipating events and not reacting to them. However, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, the Union as a security provider is not standing still and is beginning 
to  build  on  its  considerable  experience,  for  example  by  supporting  effective  mediation 
between Sudan and South Sudan and helping regional organisations such as the African 
Union in dealing with the ongoing conflict in Somalia.10 
There is a question as to whether EU member states see the Union as the principal vector of 
their cooperation in security and defence matters or as one platform among others. The EU 
hardly featured on the radar screen during military operations in Libya in 2011 and its role 
was  marginal  to  the  recent  French  intervention  in  Mali.  The  EU  still  lacks  permanent 
operational headquarters and is unlikely to acquire them soon, given the opposition of the 
UK  but  also  other  countries.  The  strategic  culture  of  most  EU  member  states  is  not  an 
‘expeditionary’ one and, when sizeable multinational military operations are to be deployed, 
NATO seems to most Europeans the safest option. For the foreseeable future, the role of the 
Union as a security provider is best seen as complementary, modular and preventive. This 
entails both limitations and opportunities, not least for cooperation with important partners 
such as Brazil.  
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First, the EU cannot handle complex crisis situations on its own. But it can bring much added 
value  in  conjunction  with  others.  All  military  operations  under  the  CSDP  have  been 
launched within the frame of a UN resolution and the EU has acquired much experience in 
cooperating with the UN and regional organisations on the ground, as well as with NATO. 
The record is surely mixed, but it does point to the shape of future interventions, where 
national initiatives, coalitions of the willing and multilateral efforts will likely overlap. 
Second,  there  are  many  ways  through  which  the  EU  can  support  peace  and  stability, 
regardless of whether that includes boots on the ground or not. Humanitarian support to 
refugees  and  displaced  people  is  a  case  in  point  at  the  peak  of  a  crisis,  often  alongside 
concrete  engagement  in  crisis  diplomacy,  followed  by  engagement  in  capacity  and 
institution-building in fragile or failed states, including via civilian CSDP missions. The EU 
has financed the setting up of a crisis or situation room at the headquarters of the Arab 
League, and is planning to do the same with the African Union.11 Some of these measures fit 
with the broadly preventive approach of the EU as a security provider, aimed to create the 
conditions for lasting stability. Failures are much more visible than incremental progress on 
this score but it is equally the case that, from the Sahel to Palestine via Somalia, peace would 
stand little chance without the sustained involvement of the EU and of its member states via 
development assistance, security sector reform and support for democracy, human rights 
and good governance at large. Demand for these deliverables will arguably grow with a 
view to sustain peace and security in fragile regions. 
4.   Reading change: Where you sit is where you stand 
When assessing the evolution of the international system, where you sit is where you stand. 
The difference in the relative positions of the EU and Brazil explains their distinct readings of 
the  emerging  order,  or  disorder.  The  redistribution  of  power  and  the  accompanying 
geopolitical tensions, as well as growing instability in the EU’s neighbourhood, challenge the 
normative outlook and strategic approach of the EU. A great deal of the EU’s international 
role and identity is predicated on replacing the rule of power with the power of rules in 
global affairs.  
As such, the Union has been branded as a post-modern actor bent on overcoming geopolitics 
and  the  balance  of  power  through  diplomacy,  engagement  and  multilateral  regimes, 
progressively eroding the hard shell of national sovereignty.12 With this branding, however, 
came also a warning. Europeans may well be past the modern Westphalian system in their 
mutual  relations,  but  the  surrounding  world  remained  populated  by  proud,  modern 
sovereign powers, keen on maximising their relative gains through hard and soft means. 
And vast areas of instability resemble the pre-modern world of weak states and widespread 
human insecurity. 
This diagnosis may be too clear-cut to describe the more complex dynamics at play within 
different regions and countries, and within Europe itself. While the EU has been preaching a 
largely post-modern, normative agenda, the practice of the Europeans has been much more 
uneven, including double-standards in dealings with authoritarian regimes. By and large, 
however, the consolidation of the multilateral system was central to the grand strategy of the 
EU.13 It was taken in Europe as corresponding to the expansion of the so-called liberal order 
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to other international stakeholders, alongside the spread of globalisation. China’s entry into 
the WTO in 2001 seemed to match this vision, as did further trade liberalisation, envisaged 
under the Doha round. These developments were regarded as fitting both Europe’s values 
and its tangible interests. 
Against  this  background,  the  combined  effect  of  power  shifts,  the  financial  crisis  and 
revolutions in the Arab world requires a redrawing of the mental maps of the European 
foreign policy establishment. As in all cases of rapid transitions and multiple shocks, it takes 
time and is not a painless exercise, all the more so for a collective international actor like the 
EU. European analysts and practitioners have mostly registered the progressive shaping of a 
multipolar world. From a European standpoint, this is first and foremost a statement of fact, 
due  to  the  sheer  redistribution  of  power  assets,  and  not  a  normative  consideration.  In 
political  terms,  multipolarity  is  regarded  with  unease  both  because  it  affects  Europe’s 
influence and interests (growing geo-economic and geo-political competition) and because a 
multipolar system is generally considered an unstable one, prone to destabilisation.  
The European discourse takes the redistribution of power as one important dimension of 
ongoing  change,  but  qualifies  it  in  two  important  ways.  First,  power  is  not  just  shifting 
among states but also growing more diffuse to a variety of non-state actors and networks. 
From this standpoint, reality might have skipped multipolarity. In other words, actual power 
trends point to a polycentric and pluralistic international system and not one where a few 
countries run the show.14 Second, while power is shifting, interdependence is deepening and 
so do the challenges associated with an open but fragile international system. In an inter-
polar world, the power of major actors rests not just on relative gains but on the coordination 
and cooperation required to preserve stability, enable growth, fight illicit traffic and avoid 
the worst effects of climate change.15 In a context of mutual dependence, a zero-sum world is 
no destiny, but the possible consequence of wrong choices. One may say that the organising 
principle of the EU’s external action is becoming to prevent the slide towards a hostile zero-
sum world by default, out of a vacuum of leadership and responsibility.  
Multipolarity looks different in Brasilia. However, the ultimate concerns of the EU may not 
prove so remote from those of a rising power with a similar value system, aiming to entrench 
growth and stability in the long-run. Boosted by high growth rates and active diplomacy, 
Brazil pursues an autonomous strategy of power projection beyond its region by leveraging 
engagement in a variety of formats. From a Brazilian standpoint, the progressive shaping of 
a  multipolar  world  carries  positive  normative  connotations,  by  opposition  to  traditional 
American  and  European  hegemony.  A  multipolar  world  would  be  a  more  fair  and 
democratic place, with major emerging countries and the developing world at large playing 
a much bigger role in setting the terms of interdependence. Echoes of the traditional claims 
of the so-called global South versus the rich and selfish North co-exist (and sometimes jar) in 
the Brazilian discourse with the pragmatic pursuit of national interest on the global stage. 
Likewise, Brazil’s robust commitment to multilateralism is both principled and instrumental 
(which, to a different degree, is the case for all international actors). Suspicious of (Western) 
interference in domestic affairs, Brazil is a vocal although not unqualified supporter of the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference and of the central role of the United Nations 
(UN), notably in legitimising the use of force. As such, Brazil can be considered as both a 
conservative  and  a  revisionist  power.  It  is  reluctant  to  support  innovations  in  global 
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governance that might result in the delimitation of national autonomy, from more intrusive 
verifications  under  the  climate  or  non-proliferation  regimes  to  punitive  measure  or  the 
responsibility  to  protect,  not  least  out  of  concern  with  their  abusive  or  one-sided 
implementation. However, Brazil vocally calls for the reform of major multilateral structures 
to  carve  out  more  votes,  seats  and  power  for  large  emerging  countries.  Together  with 
Germany, India and Japan, Brazil has pushed hard for the enlargement of the UN Security 
Council to these four additional permanent members, so far to no avail. On the other hand, 
Brazil’s voting shares at the IMF substantially grew from 1.3 (before the 2008 reform) to 1.7 
(today)  to  2.2  (based  on  the  2010  reform,  not  yet  in  force).  At  purchasing  power parity, 
Brazil’s economy accounts for about 2.8% of the world GDP. 
In other words, when it comes to global governance, the EU seeks to create new regimes 
while preserving, or adjusting in a cautious and incremental way, the rules and composition 
of  traditional  multilateral  frameworks.  Brazil  is  less  interested  in  new  governance 
enterprises,  from  climate  change  to  multilateral  trade  deals,  but  aims  to  transform  the 
balance of power and some of the normative parameters underpinning existing institutions. 
Aside from formal institutional frameworks, Brazil has been investing a lot in cooperation 
with other emerging powers, notably through the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) and BASIC (BRICS less Russia) formats. 
This strategy of ‘parallel minilateralism’ is overtly directed to boost the influence of Brazil on 
the international stage. As such, it has been effective to influence the global debate on issues 
ranging from the reform of multilateral financial institutions, the legitimacy of humanitarian 
interventions  and  the  development  agenda.  BRICS  countries  have  been  holding  annual 
summits since 2009 and regularly meet at ministerial or senior official level, including on the 
side of international fora such as the G20. 
However, minilateral groupings of emerging countries are unlikely to prove viable building 
blocs of a new order.16 The priorities, geostrategic positions and value systems of the BRICS 
point  in  different  directions  over  the  medium  term,  once  the  process  of  political 
emancipation from the allegedly ‘hegemonic’ international order is accomplished and the 
responsibilities that global engagement entails are acknowledged. There is no unified bloc of 
rising  powers  shaping  up  to  confront  the  traditional  West,  including  the  EU.17  The  five 
BRICS stand out as having in common as much as what divides them.  
Brazil  and  South  Africa  are  democracies  pursuing  the  ‘democratisation’  of  international 
relations with a bigger voice for the South; Russia is a traditional if declining great power 
keen on dealing with other major players on a peer-to-peer basis. Brazil complains about 
‘currency wars’ and the under-appreciation of the Renmimbi (as well as of the US dollar), 
which affects the competitiveness of Brazilian industry at a time when China is extracting 
from  Brazil  little  more  than  natural  resources.  Russia  and  China,  jealous  of  their 
prerogatives, are reluctant to grant permanent membership on the UN Security Council to 
fellow BRICS countries. The geostrategic concerns of Brazil in the South Atlantic are remote 
from  the  threat  perceptions  of  China,  India  and  Russia.  In  political  terms,  for  all  of  the 
BRICS, the defining relationship remains that with the US, although other partnerships are 
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gaining strength. In economic terms, the EU may have lost market shares, notably in India 
and Latin America, but it remains a vital trade and notably investment partner for all the 
BRICS. Spain and Belgium alone have a larger investment stock in Brazil than the US. In 
2010, China was ranked 16th in the list of the top 20 investors in Brazil by stock.18  
5.   The way ahead: Uncovering common ground 
Closer engagement between the EU and Brazil  would offer the opportunity to challenge 
binary narratives on the fledgling international order (old vs. new powers; North vs. South) 
and to make a difference together. Gaining a better perspective sometimes requires taking a 
step  back.  The  last  few  years  have  been  hard  on  Europe  and  rewarding  for  Brazil.  But 
whether recent experience shows divergent paths ahead is a different question. Drawing 
linear projections of irreversible decline for Europe and unstoppable rise for Brazil may be 
misleading  since  Europe  has  more  assets  than  often  acknowledged  and  Brazil  faces 
considerable  challenges  to  sustain  its  remarkable  performance.  In  both  cases,  addressing 
domestic dysfunctions is a requirement for influence abroad. If they were to succeed, both 
actors could be regarded as emerging ones on the international stage. And they would share 
much more than what divides them. 
The  EU  and  Brazil  share  common  values  but  have  so  far  implemented  different  power 
strategies  –  the  former  anchored  to  the  so-called  ‘Western  camp’,  the  latter  bent  on 
challenging  it  through  soft  balancing.19  However,  both  are  well  placed  to  overcome  the 
sterile and outdated distinction between North and South. The contention here is that, over 
time, what may come to define global actors will be less their growth rates than their political 
and normative outlooks, at home and abroad. This is not to argue that new divides will or 
should  be  drawn  on  normative  grounds,  for  example  between  democracies  and 
undemocratic regimes. On the contrary, it is to stress the important bridging role that the EU 
and Brazil could play to expand the common ground between different perceptions and 
agendas. The future will not be shaped by established or rising powers but will likely have to 
be co-shaped. Those with the will and ability to connect across traditional cleavages will 
stand to gain the most influence. 
The  strategic  partnership  that  the  EU  and  Brazil  have  established  in  2007  has 
underperformed in many ways. But poor implementation so far should not detract from the 
aim to leverage bilateral engagement to improve cooperation in broader formats. So-called 
‘strategic  partnerships’  can  be  regarded  as  fulfilling  three  important  roles.20  First,  they 
position  the  two  parties  on  the  map  as  pivotal  mutual  interlocutors.  This  is  important 
political currency for both the EU, whose international actorness is often questioned, and for 
Brazil, which has long pursued its ‘insertion’ in the big league. Second, structured bilateral 
relations  provide  the  level  playing  field  for  trade-offs  to  maximise  respective  interests, 
notably in the economic sphere. The partnership as such has not matched expectations on 
this account, with the trade deal held hostage to inter-regional politics and protectionism on 
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the rise. That said, a traditionally asymmetric economic relationship has evolved into a more 
balanced one with sustained two-way investment flows and Brazil becoming the fifth-largest 
investor  in  the  EU.  The  last  bilateral  summit  in  January  2013  suggests  that  recession  in 
Europe and the economic slowdown in Brazil might have focused the minds of both parties 
on the opportunities that closer engagement might bring for growth.21  
The third and key function of the strategic partnership is to help address together big issues 
on the international agenda through regular consultations, including in international fora. As 
noted  above,  progress  has  been  slim  but  some  areas  for  renewed  engagement  can  be 
detected.  Climate  change  is  one,  as  discussed  in  other  working papers  prepared  for  this 
project.22 The EU has been leading from the front to reduce carbon emissions and Brazil has 
passed national legislation including binding reduction targets, while discretely mediating 
between  advanced  and  emerging  or  developing  countries  in  the  run-up  to  the  Durban 
summit in December 2011.23 Their efforts will simply be vain if they fail to bring more parties 
on board to commit to meaningful and somehow verifiable targets. 
Political and security affairs offer much opportunity for the EU and Brazil to join forces, if 
pragmatic cooperation progressively diminishes normative dissonance and assuages long-
held suspicions of Western imperialism in Brazil. The latter has been making a growing 
contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. In early 2013, Brazil is the 11th largest provider 
of troops to peacekeeping operations, with a total of about 2,200 officers. While Brazilian 
forces serve in operations in Africa (for example in Liberia, South Sudan and Ivory Coast) 
and the Middle East (Lebanon), 99% of Brazilian troops are concentrated in the MINUSTAH 
mission in Haiti, which Brazil also leads.24 This is a significant effort but also one that could 
pave the way for more relevant engagements beyond Latin America, notably in the African 
continent where the vast majority of peacekeepers are deployed. Peacekeeping is an area of 
clear potential synergy between the EU, its member states and Brazil, notably when it comes 
to sharing lessons, devising comprehensive approaches to humanitarian emergencies and 
deploying jointly. Bilateral negotiations are ongoing on a framework agreement for Brazilian 
personnel to take part in CSDP operations, following similar deals with eight other partners, 
including Canada, Turkey and the US. 
Of course, broader normative and geopolitical considerations surround issues of peace and 
security. At the core of the international security conundrum lies the tension between the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference on the one side, and those of human rights 
and their protection on the other. Both have deep roots in international law (as well as in the 
Treaty of Lisbon and the Constitution of Brazil) and, as any other legal norms, their practise 
and interpretation are subject to evolution. Work on the concept of human security and the 
progressive codification of the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) challenge both the 
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unconditional  support  of  the  principle  of  sovereignty  and  the  unbound  pursuit  of  the 
‘humanitarian’ agenda by military means.  
Brazil  has  tried  to  build  on  the  framework  of  R2P  with  the  notion  of  the  so-called 
‘responsibility while protecting’. According to this approach, the three pillars of R2P (the 
responsibility  of  individual  states  to  protect  their  population,  the  responsibility  of  the 
international community to help them do so and, if that fails, its responsibility to take action) 
should be seen as strictly sequential in both chronological and political terms, with military 
action  regarded  as  the  very  last  resort  and  subject  to  the  careful  assessment  of  its 
consequences.25 Besides, ‘responsibility while protecting’ entails that military action should 
not  only  be  authorised  by  the  UN  Security  Council  but  should  also  be  more  closely 
monitored in its implementation. Intervention should be carried out within the limits and to 
fulfil the ends indicated in UN resolutions. While the politics of intervention are not an exact 
science and flexibility has to be built into action, the Brazilian contribution can be seen as a 
step towards bridging agendas and perceptions. It is telling that the cold reception by the US 
and EU members states, in the aftermath of the air campaign in Libya, has been paralleled by 
prudent  silence  on  the  part  of  other  BRICS  countries,  except  the  endorsement  of  South 
Africa.  
This initiative fits a broader, if very cautious, development of Brazil’s diplomatic posture, 
alongside  the  shift  from  the  Lula  to  the  Rousseff  administration.  Since  2011,  Brazilian 
diplomacy has taken more distance from authoritarian or illiberal regimes in Latin America 
and beyond, including for example Iran. While not supporting further sanctions on Iran and 
initially  hesitating  to  condemn  the  Assad  regime  in  Syria,  Brazil  is  increasingly 
uncomfortable with the dangers and consequences of diplomatic stalemate on both accounts. 
In the course of 2012, Brazil, supported two UN General Assembly resolutions condemning 
human rights abuses and calling for political transition in Syria.26 The EU and Brazil should 
deepen their direct exchanges on major security crises, as both of them will be called upon to 
exercise greater responsibilities in this domain. At their last summit in January 2013, they 
agreed to formally establish a high-level dialogue on matters of peace and security, including 
peacekeeping and peace-building.  
Crisis  diplomacy  and  crisis  management  pose  inevitable  political  obstacles  but  a  wider 
preventive agenda offers much scope for more structured cooperation, at the nexus between 
democracy and development. As in other policy areas, diverse historical experiences and 
attitudes to development cooperation and institutional capacity-building can provide inputs 
to define more effective approaches and concrete, joint or mutually reinforcing, initiatives. 
State fragility and bad governance, whether in Latin America or in Africa, are a common 
concern  of  Brazil  and  the  EU,  not  least  because  they  provide  fertile  ground  for  the 
proliferation of illicit trafficking across the South Atlantic and over to Europe.  
Brazil has been reluctant to be seen as associated or working with the EU – a traditional 
donor from the North – for example in Africa. But there is growing recognition that the two 
parties can at least experiment with selective cooperation on specific issues via triangulation 
with third countries. Following the so far limited experience of triangular cooperation to 
promote bio-fuels in Africa, the European Commission has signed the Charter of Brasilia in 
January  2013.  The  latter  envisages  joint  initiatives  with  Portuguese-speaking  countries  in 
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Africa on issues of citizenship and electoral democracy. If implemented, these and other 
small  bottom-up  projects  may  play  an  important  role  to  incrementally  build  confidence 
among the EU and Brazil, as important shapers of the future development agenda.27  
6.   Conclusion 
The EU and Brazil share more than what divides them, but their current outlook on the 
emerging  multipolar  system  differs.  Launched  in  the  reassuring  post-cold  war  strategic 
environment, the EU common foreign and security policy has had to cope with a turbulent 
regional and global context in the last decade. The financial crisis has been a game-changer, 
accelerating the redistribution of power away from Europe and creating more political space 
for rising powers on the international stage, including through recently-established formats 
such as the BRICS. Revolutions in the Arab world and the shift in the geostrategic priorities 
of the US require the EU to become more pragmatic and nimble as both a security provider 
and a normative entrepreneur. In both respects, Brazil can become a truly strategic partner of 
the  Union  as  its  responsibilities  are  set  to  grow  in  parallel  with  its  global  outreach  and 
interests.  Political  and  security  affairs,  amongst  other  issues,  offer  considerable  room  for 
deepening cooperation, from crisis management to preventive diplomacy and the normative 
debate on responsibility to protect. Joint initiatives in third countries, addressing the nexus 
between  development  and  democracy,  could  become  another  terrain  for  mutual 
engagement.  This  would  also  help  overcome  questionable  divides  between  old  and  new 
powers, or between the global North and South, and shape new shared agendas. 
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